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The environment in which discourse operates has 
become more and more complex since the time of Aristotle. 
To accommodate the increasing complexity of the environ-
ment, discourse has undergone several modifications. 
It changed from pure public oratory to written discourse, 
and it changed from mainly persuasive content to four major 
types of content: expressive, referential, literary, and 
persuasive. As discourse progressed into the twentieth 
century, the emphasis on the subjective and the emotional 
aspects of discourse gradually diminished, states Richard 
Weaver, the spotlight having shifted to scientific methods 
and logic (201). Weaver believes that this shifting of 
emphasis contributed largely to the downfall of rhetoric, a 
discipline which depended heavily on the appeal to the 
rational and the emotional aspects of man, causing the once 
noble and most honored discipline in the humanities to 
become less and less important as a standard both for the 
composition and the criticism of discourse (201). 
The downfall of rhetoric since the turn of the century 
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coincided with the appearance of new terminology in 
composition literature. Terms such as voice, stance, 
~, inductive and deductive logic have gradually replaced 
the rhetorical terms ethos, gathos, and logos. The 
physical appearance of the new terms is obviously different 
from that of the traditional Greek counterparts; the new 
terms are pronounced differently, they look more familiar, 
and they come from different languages. However, does the 
meaning of the new terminology differ substantially from 
that of the old? This question has not attracted much 
attention from researchers. Most researchers appear to 
accept the replacement of one term with another; few seem 
interested enough to investigate whether the new termino-
logy actually changed the essential meaning conveyed 
by the traditional rhetorical terminology. 
This paper represents one researcher's effort to 
answer the question of whether the meaning of the new 
terminology differs substantially from that of the tradi-
tional terminology. However, to compare and contrast all 
the replaced rhetorical terms with their new counterparts 
would be a monumental undertaking beyond the scope of this 
thesis. To keep the topic within a manageable scope, I 
chose in this paper to investigate only one classical 
rhetorical term and its new counterparts. The result of 
this investigation should shed some light on the question 
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regarding the substitution of meaning. Ideally the result 
of this investigation will stimulate interest in similar 
research. 
The rhetorical term I chose to investigate is ethos 
because of the emphasis Aristotle placed on ethos. In his 
Rhetoric, Aristotle describes ethos as "the most potent of 
all the means to persuasion" (Cooper 9). Given the choice 
of the entire pool of rhetorical terms, I believe it 
appropriate to investigate the most significant component 
of rhetoric. Thus the choice of ethos. 
The first step in any investigation of terminology 
should be to define the meaning of the crucial terms, and 
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I do not intend to break from that tradition. However, an 
attempt to define ethos can be a difficult task, because 
there is no consensus among rhetoricians about the defini-
tion of ethos. Students of rhetoric tend to quote or refer 
to one famous rhetorician's specific definition rather than 
to a consensus definition. This lack of consensus may be 
attributed to the long history of rhetoric or to the lack 
of academic conferences in ancient times. Nevertheless, 
the problem with scattered, individualized definitions can 
be solved in two ways. One solution is to combine the 
elements offered in all the individualized definitions into 
one general definition. This solution has one drawback: 
the eventual general definition will be too cumbersome, 
broad, and possibly self-contradictory to be useful as a 
standard. The second solution is to pick out two extremes 
from the individualized definitions and propose a working 
definition of ethos along a continuum between the two 
extremes. The resulting continuum may encompass all the 
individualized definitions and still be accurate enough to 
serve as a standard. I chose to adopt the second solution 
in seeking a general, working definition of ethos. 
A preliminary survey of the ancient Greek and Roman 
rhetoricians' individualized definitions reveals that 
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ethos can be limited by two extremes. One extreme defines 
ethos as the portrayal of the human character of the 
speaker or writer, implying human goodness, morality, and 
virtues. The other extreme presents ethos as any tech-
nique, ethical or otherwise, that will help the orator to 
appear to be a worthy individual so that he can attain his 
persuasive goals. The results of this preliminary survey 
indicate that the interpretational continuum for ethos 
appears to be anchored by two poles, normative and utili-
tarian. Ideally, ethos should paint a moral and ethical 
portrait of the orator or that of his client. However, to 
attain this normative image, the orator must use techniques 
that may or may not be consistent with the moral and 
ethical image. In other words, the end is lofty and pure, 
but, for the speaker to reach this lofty end, means which 
are not so pure but are quite useful may be employed. 
Definitions of ethos move along this continuum throughout 
the ages. Indeed, quite often the definition of a single 
rhetorician swings from one extreme to another. The 
rhetorician will define ethos as the purest sentiment on 
earth, and then advise techniques not so pure to attain the 
goal. Because each rhetorician holds such conflicting 
views of ethos, it iu difficult to rank a rhetorician along 
the continuum. It is easier, however, to place his 
internally inconsistent views at the appropriate spots 
along the continuum. This latter method, which is adopted 
in later chapters, will help eliminate confusion in 
examining the usually internally inconsistent views of 
ethos. 
Before I can engage in a comparison of ethos and its 
twentieth-century counterparts, I need to supply a back-
ground of the origin and the definitions of ethos through-
out the ages to clarify the essential meaning of the term. 
Consequently, Chapter II and Chapter III will be devoted 
to an historical survey of the most important rhetoricians' 
views of ethos. The rhetoricians surveyed in these two 
chapters are chosen because they are probably the most 
influential and because their definitions of ethos are the 
most often quoted. In Chapter IV, I will investigate the 
similarities and differences between ethos and its twen-
5 




ETHOS AS DEFINED BY GREEK AND ROMAN RHETORICIANS: 
ARISTOTLE, QUINTILIAN, AND CICERO 
Aristotle 
Ethos was first defined by Aristotle, the father of 
rhetoric. His definition of ethos set down the guidelines 
that the majority of rhetoricians followed until the turn 
of this century. In his Rhetoric (c. 333 B.C.), Aristotle 
divides all persuasive appeals into three categories: 
logos, pathos, and ethos. 
through logical argument; 
Logos appeals to the audience 
pathos appeals to the audience 
by engaging the audience's emotions; and ethos appeals to 
the audience by the speaker's "evincing through the speech 
a personal character that will win the confidence of the 
listener" (Cooper xxxvii). This "personal character" can 
be that of the speaker or that of his client, depending on 
the occasion. The past reputation of either the speaker or 
his client cannot be considered as part of the "personal 
character." Instead the personal character portrayed in 
the speech should be created by the speech itself (Cooper 
8 ) . 
A personal character that can inspire the confidence 
of the audience cannot be immoral or unethical. On the 
contrary, Aristotle believes that the personal character of 
the speaker as portrayed in the speech must be virtuous, 
noble, and above reproach (Cooper 46). To properly portray 
a personal character in a speech, Aristotle states, the 
speaker should have a thorough knowledge of human 
character, which involves knowing how to evince intelli-
gence, good character, and good will through the speech 
(Cooper 92). 
To portray intelligence and good character in the 
speech, advised Aristotle, the speaker should portray 
himself or his client as "just, courageous, liberal 
[generous], temperate, magnanimous, sagacious, magnificent, 
gentle, and wise" (Cooper 47). Mentioning deeds that are 
performed in the spirit of the above nine virtues in the 
speech can also produce the same desired effect of portray-
ing intelligence and good character (Cooper 48-9). 
To evince goodwill, advises Aristotle, the speaker 
should have a thorough knowledge of important human 
emotions such as anger, mildness, love, hatred, fear, 
confidence, shame, shamelessness, benevolence and the lack 
of it, pity, indignation, envy, emulation, and contempt 
(Cooper 93-131). For each emotion, Aristotle discussed in 
detail three aspects: (1) the mental state of the person 
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aroused by the emotion, (2) the kind of people who usually 
arouse the emotion in the person, and (3) the things that 
easily make a person feel that emotion (Cooper 92). To 
evince good will, says Aristotle, the speaker should know 
the three aspects of each emotion so that he can put the 
audience in the right state of mind, receptive to the 
speaker and the purpose of the speech (Cooper 91). 
In his discussion of ethos, Aristotle was mainly 
concerned with the ways of creating the impressions of a 
personal character in a speech. He was not concerned with 
the speaker's true personal character, a lack of concern 
that comes from Aristotle's definition of rhetoric: the 
"faculty of discovering in the particular case the 
available means of persuasion" (Cooper 7). In other words, 
Aristotle was interested in investigating and teaching the 
means to achieve persuasion. Thus, regardless of the 
speaker's past reputation and his true character, as long 
as the speaker mastered the techniques of creating an 
appropriate personal character for a particular speech, he 
could sway the judgment of the audience in his favor. 
Aristotle's emphasis on techniques and his lack of interest 
in the speaker's true character place his definition of 
ethos closer to the utilitarian pole of the continuum than 
to the normative pole. Graphically, the location of 
Aristotle's definition on the continuum should be close to 
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the area where the normative half blends into the utili-
tarian half (see Appendix). 
Marcus Tullius Cicero 
Cicero, holding a different view of ethos in his 
Oratory (c. 45 B.C.), believed that an orator should be a 
"good man" and that ethos referred to the goodness of the 
orator, not to the character to be created in the speech 
(105-6). However, Cicero did not define goodness, nor did 
he offer a criterion for measuring goodness. Cicero's 
translator, J. S. Watson, offers a reason for the rather 
short discussion on the goodness of the orator. Watson 
states that Cicero "thinks a good character [is] of great 
importance in an orator," though Cicero does not deny that 
much eloquence may at times be found in a man of buu 
character (Oratory 105). 
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This internally inconsistent view of ethos makes 
placing Cicero's definition of ethos on the continuum a 
little more difficult. By definition, Cicero's view of 
ethos belongs to the normative pole of the continuum. 
However, Cicero's reluctance to state that a bad man cannot 
be an orator indicates that Cicero does not hold as extreme 
a view as the definition might suggest. Consequently, in 
placing Cicero's definition of ethos on the continuum, I 
chose to place it in the normative half of the continuum 
but close to the area where the normative half blends into 
the utilitarian half (see Appendix). 
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The same problem with internal consistency appears in 
Cicero's discussion of the techniques that an orator can 
employ. Cicero claims that the secret to rhetorical 
victory lies in the orator's possessing a minute and 
thorough knowledge of all the details involved in each 
situation: a thorough preparation, a thorough knowledge of 
all the rhetorical skills, and a good presentation of the 
speaker's or his client's character (Oratory 110). These 
four elements are "more easily adorned by eloquence if they 
really exist, than [they are] invented if they have no 
existence" (Oratory 132). This statements implies that 
particulars involving the four elements may sometimes be 
invented. However, in making this statement, Cicero was 
not condoning cheating or the use of techniques that are 
inconsistent with his definition of ethos. Rather he was 
pointing out that goodness and skills alone do not always 
guarantee victory, nor do lack of them guarantee defeat. 
In placing on the continuum Cicero's discussion of 
techniques to project the orator's or his client's charac-
ter, I face the same problem as I did with placing his 
definition of ethos. Cicero's discussion contains 
extremely utilitarian views, such as inventing details if 
necessary, and views that are utilitarian but not extreme, 
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such as advice to know the subject matter and the audience. 
The extreme views are not typical of Cicero's practice or 
advice, so I placed his discussion of techniques in the 
middle of the utility half of the continuum (see Appendix). 
Marcus Fabius Quintilianus 
Like Cicero, Quintllian also views ethos differently 
from Aristotle. In his Institutes of Oratory (c. 88 A.D.), 
Quintllian states that ethos refers to the "moral goodness'' 
of the speaker, not to a created personal character in the 
speech (2:391-402). Quintilian's view of ethos is consis-
tent with his distinction between orators and those who are 
merely eloquent. He claims that orators possess ethos, 
defined as moral goodness, while those who are merely 
eloquent lack the moral goodness of the orators 
(2:391-402). In making the distinction between an orator 
and one who is merely eloquent, Quintilian solved Cicero's 
dilemma of being unable to claim that only a man with a 
good character can be an orator. 
In his discussion of the qualities of the orator, 
Quintilian went a step further than merely defining ethos 
as the moral goodness of the speaker. He equated ethos 
with sainthood. The orator Quintilian envisions must be 
"a man who, being possessed of the highest natural genius, 
stores his mind thoroughly with the most valuable kinds of 
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knowledge; a man sent by the gods to do honour to the 
world, and such as no preceding age has known; a man in 
every way eminent and excellent, a thinker of the best 
thoughts and a speaker of the best language" (2: 397). 
Qulntillan's description of the qualities, or ethos, of the 
orator qualifies his view for placement on the normative 
pole of the continuum. Graphically, this location should 
be right on the pole. It is difficult to envision a more 
extreme view of ethos (see Appendix). 
However normative his definition of ethos is, Quinti-
lian has a surprisingly utilitarian view of the techniques 
that an orator can employ to attain his persuasive goals. 
The saintly orator can employ all rhetorical techniques, 
even those which are not consistent with sainthood, such as 
"withhold(ingl the truth from the judge" (Quintilian 
2:399). Such acts are permissible as long as the orator 
always possesses "uprightness of intention" (Quintilian 
2: 402). Thus the unsaintly means justify the saintly 
ends. Obviously, Qulntilian's view of the techniques that 
an orator can employ is very different from his view of the 
qualities of an orator. on the continuum, his view of the 
rhetorical techniques available to an orator should be 
located close to the utilitarian pole, indeed, closer to 
that pole than Aristotle's because Aristotle never went so 
far as to advise hiding the truth from the audience (see 
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Appendix). 
Quintilian seems to deal in extremes. His model for 
an orator is extremely normative, while his advice on 
techniques certainly leans toward the opposite extreme. 
Cicero's views are not split into such extremes. His 
definition of ethos and his advice about rhetorical 
techniques tend to lean toward the area where the normative 
and the utility halves converge. Thus Cicero expresses 
both some normative and utilitarian views, quite inconsis-
tent and paradoxically quite practical. Quintilian, 
however, held more extreme views. 
Both Cicero and Quintilian believe that ethos should 
refer to the real character of the speaker, not merely to 
the character created by the speech. As we shall see in 
the following chapters, their view of ethos triumphed 
frequently over that of Aristotle in later centuries. 
CHAPTER III 
ECCLESIASTICAL, EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY, AND NINETEENTH-
CENTURY RHETORICIANS: ST. AUGUSTINE, 
CAMPBELL, BLAIR, WHATELY 
AND CHANNING 
Saint Augustine 
Saint Augustine wrote on the subject of eloquence to 
set a model for ecclesiastical students to follow in their 
ecclesiastical careers. In his On Christian Doctrine (c. 
426 A.D.), Saint Augustine was not interested in teaching 
"the rules of rhetoric" which he had learned and taught in 
secular schools (118). Rather he wanted to paint a picture 
of what the ideal preacher should be and to describe how 
the ecclesiastical students should go about attaining such 
a status. True to his purpose, Saint Augustine did not 
organize his treatise on the basis of rhetorical cate-
gories, nor did he discuss any specific rhetorical termino-
logy. As a result, the term ethos was not discussed 
directly in On Christian Doctrine. Instead ethos was 
discussed under the general terms of how an ecclesiastical 
student can attain eloquence. 
15 
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Before discussing Saint Augustine's ideas concerning 
ethos, we need to gain an understanding of his concept of 
eloquence. Saint Augustine regards eloquence as a tool 
that can be employed successfully by both truth and 
falsehood: "the faculty of eloquence, which is of great 
value in urging either evil or justice, is in itself 
indifferent" (On Christian Doctrine 118). In admitting 
openly that eloquence can be employed successfully both by 
evil and goodness, Saint Augustine went a step further than 
Cicero, a secular rhetorician whom Saint Augustine greatly 
admired. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Cicero only implied 
that eloquence can be found in a man of bad character, but 
Saint Augustine left no room for doubt regarding the 
relationship between eloquence and truth and falsehood. 
Saint Augustine bad a reason for stating so clearly 
the relationship between eloquence and truth and falsehood: 
to shake the ecclesiastical students out of their com-
placence and their belief that truth equals eloquence. A 
reading of Saint Augustine's On Christian Doctrine leaves 
one with the impression that the ecclesiastical students 
were content to disregard the techniques of rhetoric, 
believing that truth, which was on their side, would 
miraculously effect desirable changes in the audience. 
Well schooled in secular rhetoric, Saint Augustine did not 
believe that truth without eloquence can effect any 
favorable changes in the audience at all. The following 
statement indicates clearly the relationship that Saint 
Augustine perceived between eloquence, truth, and false-
hood. 
For since by means of the art of 
rhetoric both truth and falsehood are 
urged, who would dare to say that 
truth should stand in the person of 
its defenders unarmed against lying, 
so that they who wish to urge false-
hoods may know how to make their 
listeners benevolent, or attentive, or 
docile in their presentation, while 
the defenders of truth are ignorant of 
that art? Should they speak briefly, 
clearly, and plausibly while the 
defenders of truth speak so that they 
tire their listeners, make themselves 
difficult to understand and what they 
have to say dubious? Should they 
oppose the truth with fallacious 
arguments and assert falsehoods, while 
the defenders of truth have no ability 
either to defend the truth or to 
oppose the false? Should they, urging 
the minds of their listeners into 
error, ardently exhort them, moving 
them by speech so that they terrify, 
sadden, and exhilarate them, while the 
defenders of truth are sluggish, cold, 
and somnolent? (118) 
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Clearly, Saint Augustine wanted the ecclesiastical students 
to master the techniques of eloquence. Armed with these 
techniques, they can "teach, delight, and move'' the 
audience, stating truth or justice in "pleasing" terms 
so that ''the just rather than the wicked [will] be more 
willingly heard" (On Christian Doctrine 137-9). He regards 
an individual as eloquent who can "teach, delight, and 
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persuade" and who will be heard ''intelligently, willingly, 
and obediently" (On Christian Doctrine 142). In not using 
persuasion as the sole test of eloquence, Saint Augustine 
may have made the goal of eloquence more attainable for the 
ecclesiastical students. Such an attainable goal as 
compared to a vague goal of persuasion (it is difficult to 
measure the audience's acceptance of the speaker's view) 
may have better served Saint Augustine's purpose for 
writing his treatise--to help the ecclesiastical students 
be better servants of God. 
Saint Augustine's ideas regarding ethos evolve from 
his concept of eloquence. Because he did not intend his 
writing to be a textbook on rhetoric, Saint Augustine did 
not set down specific techniques whereby his readers could 
learn how to create ethos in their speeches. Instead he 
discussed two phases of ethos: one phase containing his 
ideas about what the eccl~siastical students should do; 
and the other phase containing ideas about what the 
ecclesiastical students ~do. In discussing what 
ecclesiastical students should do, Saint Augustine states 
that an ecclesiastical student should be "the expositor and 
teacher of the Divine Scripture, the defender of right 
faith and the enemy of error ... [he] should both teach 
the good and extirpate the evil. And in this labor of 
words, he should conciliate those who are opposed, arouse 
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those who are remiss, and teach those ignorant of his 
subject what is occurring and what they should expect" (On 
Christian Doctrine 120-121) (italics mine). The lofty and 
abstract diction of this statement corresponds to that of 
Quintilian in his discussion of the ideal orator. In both 
Saint Augustine's and Quintilian's discussion, the goal was 
an ideal, a normative model, a goal that one should work 
toward but not necessarily attain. The repetition of the 
word should in the statement bears evidence that the 
discussion is geared toward what should be, not ~~. 
The discussion in the following paragraphs will further 
substantiate my claim that the goal set forth by Saint 
Augustine was considered to be an ideal, but not ne-
cessarily attainable, goal. 
In discussing what the ecclesiastical students ~ 
do, Saint Augustine states that the ecclesiastical students 
need to learn the techniques of rhetoric so that they can 
state the truth in such a manner that the speech not only 
teaches but also delights and persuades (On Christian 
Doctrine 137). Saint Augustine also warned the ecclesias--
tical students against employing eloquence devoid of 
content, quoting Cicero's statement that "wisdom without 
eloquence is of small benefit to states; but eloquence 
without wisdom is often extremely injurious and profits no 
one" (On Christian Doctrine 121). 
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Regarding the character of the ecclesiastical student, 
Saint Augustine states that the ecclesiastical student in 
his personal life does not have to follow the standards 
that he preaches to his congregation. He states that a 
preacher "who speaks wisely and eloquently, but lives 
wickedly, may benefit many students" (On Christian Doctrine 
164). This comment implies that the character of the 
preacher should be created by the speech; the true 
character or the reputation of the preacher are, in Saint 
Augustine's view, not usually relevant to the issue of 
eloquence. 
However, Saint Augustine does concede that a good 
character can benefit the preacher greatly under three 
situations. The first situation occurs when those who 
live evil lives use the discrepancy between the preacher's 
personal life and his preaching as an excuse for not accep-
ting the content of his preaching (On Christian Doctrine 
165). At such times, being consistent "in word, in 
conduct, in charity, in faith, [and] in chastity" will 
carry more weight than being merely eloquent (On Christian 
Doctrine 165). The second situation occurs when the 
preacher fails to master the techniques of eloquence (On 
Christian Doctrine 166). His only choice then would be to 
use the strict conformity between his preaching and his way 
of living as a substitute for lack of eloquence. The 
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example set by his way of living will be as eloquent as a 
well-delivered and eloquent speech in preaching the words 
of God. The third and not the least important situation 
arises when the preacher would like to "prepare n reward 
for himself" (On Christian Doctrine 166). As Saint 
Augustine put it, the preacher who "lives wickedly . is 
unprofitable to his own soul," while the preacher who lives 
according to the standard he preaches prepares rewards for 
himself (On Christian Doctrine 164-6). 
Except for the last situation, the character of the 
preacher is used as a mean to persuasion. Thus, for Saint 
Augustine, the character of the preacher functions as a 
backup for the ethos created by the speech. When the 
content of the speech is questioned, the good character of 
the preacher functions as a refutation of frivolous 
excuses. And when the ethos is not created very well in 
the speech due to the preacher's lack of training in 
rhetoric, the good character of the preacher compensates 
for the poorly created ethos in the preaching. This use 
of the character of the preacher as a means of persuasion 
indicates that Saint Augustine regards ethos both as 
created by the speech and by the orator's reputation. The 
amount of emphasis laid on the former indicates that Saint 
Augustine tends to regard ethos as created by the speech. 
Saint Augustine's use of two phases for ethos--one 
normative, dictating what should be, and one positive, 
describing what is--diminished the gap between this divine 
teacher of the words of God and the secular rhetoricians 
that came before him. His normative phase is no different 
from Quintilian's, and his positive phase is similar to 
Cicero's though at a more developed stage. Consequently, 
in placing Saint Augustine's two phases of ethos on the 
continuum, I placed the normative phase close to the point 
that denotes Quintilian's definition of ethos (right next 
to the normative pole) and the positive phase to the right 
of Cicero's definition of ethos (see Appendix). 
George Campbell 
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George Campbell devoted little space to ethos in his 
The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776). His lack of enthusiasm 
about ethos is understandable since he did not consider 
ethos as a means of persuasion. Campbell believed that 
ethos, properly subsumed under pathos, should be considered 
as a means of persuasion through emotion. 
Short as his discussion of ethos is, Campbell still 
considered ethos from two perspectives, the personal 
morality of the speaker and the practical techniques of 
gaining ethos. Regarding the morality of the speaker, 
Campbell follows closely the Ciceronian belief that "in 
order to be a successful orator, one must be a good man; 
for to be good is the only sure way of being long esteemed 
good, and to be esteemed good is previously necessary to 
one's being heard with due attention and regard" (97). 
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This comment might lead one to believe that campbell 
believes ethos comes from the speaker's reputation. 
Actually, he believes that ethos comes from both the 
creation in the speech and the speaker's reputation. For 
instance, he defines ethos as the quality in a speech that 
shows the speaker as "both a wise and good man . . . in the 
opinion of those whom he addresseth" (99). Consequently, 
campbell's ethos is a combination of both reputation and 
the creation of character in the speech. 
Regarding the techniques of creating ethos in the 
speech, Campbell was mainly concerned with the means of 
combating prejudice, either personal or partisan. camp-
bell described partisan prejudice as "party-spirit," which 
is the "most pernicious, being at once the most inflexible 
and the most unjust" (97). Personal or partisan prejudice 
cannot do justice to the ethos of the speaker, states 
Campbell, because the "divinest eloquence" uttered by a 
speaker whose "life were ever so blameless" can fall on 
deaf ears if the speaker happens to be of the wrong party, 
either religious or political (97). 
campbell also claims that the quality of the audience 
may influence the amount of prejudice directed toward the 
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speaker. "The more gross the hearers are, so much the 
more susceptible they are of such prejudices," states 
Campbell (97). Usually the more educated and refined are 
less susceptible to prejudice. However, Campbell was quick 
to warn that "even men of the most improved intellects, and 
most refined sentiments, are not altogether beyond the 
reach of preconceived opinion, either in the speaker's 
favour or to his prejudice" (98). 
To overcome prejudice, Campbell advises the speaker 
to be "more cautious in every step he takes, to show more 
·modesty, and greater deference to the judgment of his 
hearers" (98). To win a hostile and prejudiced audience, 
campbell believes that the speaker "must attempt, if 
possible, to mollify them, gradually to insinuate himself 
into their favour, and thereby imperceptibly to transfuse 
his sentiments and passions into their minds" (98). 
In discussing the relationship between eloquence and 
truth and falsehood, Campbell differs from all his prede-
cessors. Campbell claims that the "mental powers" employed 
in rhetoric are "more friendly to truth than to falsehood, 
and more easily retained in the cause of virtue, than in 
that of vice" (72). None of Campbell's predecessors 
who have been surveyed in this paper held such an opinion. 
Aristotle considered rhetoric as means to persuasion; he 
did not consider rhetoric as favoring either truth or 
falsehood. Cicero implied that a person with a bad 
character might be truly eloquent, but he was so reluctant 
to admit to the possibility of an orator with a bad 
character that we had to obtain this piece of information 
indirectly from the translator's footnote. Quintilian 
believed that a good speaker devoid of moral goodness is 
merely an eloquent person, not deserving the title of an 
orator, thus brushing aside all argument about the rela-
tionship between eloquence and falsehood. Saint Augustine 
believed that eloquence is an indifferent tool--favoring 
neither side--that can serve truth and falsehood equally 
well. 
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Campbell's opinion that rhetoric favors truth more 
than falsehood does not agree with any of his predecessor's 
opinions. Actually, his opinion is more consistent with 
the view that Saint Augustine tried to combat in his 
treatise, the equating of truth with eloquence. However, 
Campbell's opinion differs from the opinion that Saint 
Augustine tried to combat on one major issue: Campbell 
strongly recommends the studying of rhetorical rules and 
even offers some techniques himself. Thus even though 
Campbell believed that rhetoric somehow favors truth rather 
than falsehood, he did not believe truth could persuade the 
audience without some help from rhetoric. Given this 
qualified belief, Campbell's opinion can be better classi-
fled as advocating an attitude, a righteous attitude, 
rather than an actual practice. 
Campbell's belief in both the moral goodness of the 
speaker and the favorable treatment rhetoric gives to 
truth places his definition of ethos closer to that of 
Quintilian than to that of Cicero, and so I have placed it 
there on the continuum. However, the techniques Campbell 
recommends are fairly commonplace, unlike his definition 
of ethos. They bear a close resemblance to the techniques 
recommended by Cicero, so they are placed fairly close to 
those of Cicero on the continuum (see Appendix). 
Hugh Blair 
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Hugh Blair has been accused of copying others' 
lectures and claiming them to be his own. The accusation 
has been both advanced and attacked by critics and 
followers of Hugh Blair for generations. This controver-
sial issue is mentioned here because it might explain why 
Blair did not develop any new ethical theories in his 
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783). In his 
defense, Blair and his followers attributed this lack of 
development to the purpose of his book; it was intended as 
a series of lectures delivered to fairly young scholars, 
the education of whom requires more a knowledge of tradi-
tional material than new and controversial concepts. 
Whatever the reason, the fact remains that Blair did not 
offer any original ethical concepts in his Lectures on 
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. 
In his highly lucid and remarkably well-written 
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series of lectures, Blair reiterated the concept that 
rhetoric can be used for good and bad purposes. However, 
Blair believes that given the same techniques truth is more 
likely to win than falsehood: "Give truth and virtue the 
same arms which you give vice and falsehood, and the former 
are likely to prevail" (263). On this issue, Blair's 
belief is no different from Campbell's. 
Regarding the speaker's character, Blair states that 
"in order to be a truly eloquent or persuasive speaker, 
nothing is more necessary than to be a virtuous man" 
(379-80). This comment refers to the speaker's reputation. 
However, Blair does not regard ethos as created solely 
through the speaker's reputation. For he states in a 
different lecture that "there is no instrument of persua-
sion more powerful, than an opinion of probity and honour 
in the person who undertakes to persuade" (305). This 
opinion of probity and honor is created both through the 
speaker's reputation gnd through the speech itself. 
Again, Blair's opinion agrees well with that of campbell. 
Because Blair's concepts agree closely with those of 
Campbell, Blair's concepts are placed in close proximity to 
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those of Campbell on the continuum (see Appendix). 
Richard Whately 
In discussing ethos in his Elements of Rhetoric 
(1828), Richard.Whately both accepted some traditional 
views and introduced some views of his own. He agrees with 
Aristotle and even quotes Aristotle in delineating the 
contents of ethos, which he defines as good principle, good 
sense, and friendly disposition toward the audience 
addressed (188). Whately claims that if the speaker wants 
"a permanent effect" he should "keep on the side of what he 
believes to be the truth; and, avoiding all sophistry, to 
aim only at setting forth that truth as strongly as 
possible, without any endeavour to gain applause for his 
own abilities" (214). 
The ideas that Whately set forth so far are not new; 
they correspond with those of Aristotle. However, Whately 
presented those ideas solely on the basis of their 
influence on the audience. In defining ethos, Whately 
announces that morality on the part of the speaker is not a 
quality required for its own sake. Innate morality is 
required solely for the purpose of producing the audience's 
"entire confidence" in the speaker (Whately 217). Such. 
inspiration of confidence in the audience is the most 
important means of persuasion when the "hearers are not 
completely competent judges" of the issues under dis-
cussion (Whately 217). 
Whately's view of ethos as merely a technique to 
influence the audience shows even more clearly in his 
explanation of methods the speaker uses for insinuating 
himself into the audience's favor. The speaker is advised 
to introduce his own character "in an obligue and seeming-
ly incidental manner" (Whately 204). Under no circumstan-
ces should the speaker appear "pompous" or appear to 
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insult the audience's intelligence by explaining the 
simplest concepts (Whately 204). In exploring the 
difference between the speaker and the audience, the 
speaker should be "gentle and conciliatory," not "abrupt 
and offensive" (Whately 209). Whately also advises the 
speaker to appeal to "party-spirit" either directly or 
indirectly to advance his argument. Whately also commented 
on the quality of the audience and the corresponding degree 
of sophistication required of the speaker. The ignorant 
and less educated audience is easier to rouse, while the 
more learned audience needs more sophisticated argument to 
satisfy its curiosity (205-6). Whately's comment about 
those born to power and wealth is worth noting. He 
states that those who possess "the advantages of birth, 
rank, high connexions, and wealth" have "a suspicion and 
dread of~ intellectual superiority" (211). 
Whately's concern with the audience's reaction led 
to his introduction of two ideas which are indirectly 
related to ethos. The first is that the speaker's estab-
lished reputation for eloquence detracts from the persua-
siveness of the speaker's speech instead of augmenting it: 
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"For though a reputation for eloquence, generally, is . 
influential, still in each individual case that arises, the 
more is thought of the eloquence of the speaker, the less 
will he be, really, persuasive" (Whately 213). In other 
words, the speaker's reputation may win him clients for 
his personal business, but it may not help him to persuade 
an audience on a particular occasion. Prior to Whately, 
the rhetoricians surveyed in this thesis all agreed that 
the speaker's good reputation augmented the ethos created 
by the speech. Some rhetoricians preferred to restrict 
ethos to that created by the speech alone. But no rhetori-
cian even implied that the speaker's good reputation would 
be detrimental to the speaker's persuasiveness. However, 
Whately believes otherwise. 
The second idea Whately introduced is that the display 
of rhetorical skill during the speech may be harmful to the 
speaker's persuasiveness even when the speaker's does not 
have an established reputation. Whately believes that 
"of intellectual qualifications, there is one which, it is 
evident, should not only not be blazoned forth, but should 
in a great measure be concealed, or kept out of sight; 
viz. Rhetorical skills; since whatever is attributed to 
the Eloquence of the speaker, is so much deducted from the 
strength of his cause" (210). Again this idea has 
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never been hinted at by Whately's predecessors surveyed in 
this thesis. Whately's predecessors all encouraged 
studying and using rhetorical skills; in fact, they 
believed that the more rhetorical skills the speaker 
possessed, the more eloquent he would be, and the more 
persuasive his speech would be. The displaying of rhetori-
cal skills was never discussed, though it is hard to 
imagine an eloquent spee~h not utilizing rhetorical skills, 
whether displayed ostentatiously or not. 
In insisting that a reputation for eloquence and a 
display of rhetorical skill will detract from the speaker's 
persuasiveness, Whately went a little further than Aristo-
tle toward the utilitarian pole. Aristotle was concerned 
only with the ethos created by the speech, which should be 
worthy of the audience' approval. Aristotle was not 
concerned with the speaker's reputation for eloquence, nor 
was he concerned with how the speaker's reputation should 
fit into the persuasiveness of the speech. Whately went a 
step further than Aristotle in believing that the audience 
would mistrust any display of rhetorical skills or any hint 
of a reputation for eloquence. 
Both of Whately's beliefs also break completely 
with the tradition set up by the rhetoricians who came 
after Aristotle regarding the speaker's reputation. They 
tend to believe that innate morality, if not a quality 
desirable for itself, greatly enhances or is essential for 
the persuasiveness of the speaker. Whately's belief 
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about the speaker's reputation is in direct contrast to 
this tradition. His belief represents a more sophisticated 
sense of the utility of the speaker's reputation; conse-
quently his definition of ethos should be placed on 
the utilitarian side of Aristotle's definition (See 
Appendix). 
The techniques that Whately recommended are not as 
unique as his caution that display of rhetorical skills 
may decrease the persuasiveness of the speech. His 
caution represents a more acute awareness of the audience 
and its reaction toward the use of rhetoric. In other 
words, he is more aware of the utility of rhetoric and 
ethos. His heightened sense of the utility of ethos 
places the techniques he recommends the closest to the 
utilitarian pole on the continuum (see Appendix). For 
Whately, morality was subordinate to method. 
Edward Channing 
In his Lectures Read to Seniors in Harvard College 
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(1856), Edward Channing did not offer any new development 
to ethical theory. The concepts he offered in this book 
are ones that are already familiar to us at this stage of 
our survey. Channing's definition of ethos will illustrate 
my point: 
It is his [the orator's] virtues, his 
consistency, his unquestioned sincerity 
that must get the orator attention and 
confidence now. He must not rely too 
much upon the zeal or even the sound-
ness with which he treats a question 
under immediate discussion. His 
hearers must believe that his life is 
steadily influenced by the sentiments 
he is trying to impress on them,--that 
he is willing to abide by principle 
at any hazard, and give his opinio~s 
and professions the full authority of 
his actions. There are, indeed, 
accidents and artifices that may 
secure present success to the worst 
men; but it is the general effect of 
our improved society to give an 
influence to purity, firmness, and 
stabi 1 i ty ,. on which every public 
speaker may rely for lasting considera-
tion and weight. (23) 
In other words, the speaker must have the purest character. 
The diction and the sentiment of Channing's description 
of the speaker's character belong on the same plane as 
Quintilian's. The concepts Channing taught to his seniors 
hark back to those taught in the days of ancient Rome, 
where the character of the speaker was held sacred. The 
similarity between Channing's and Quintilian's definition 
of ethos earns Channing's definition a place right next to 
that of Quintilian (see Appendix). 
Though Channing did not offer any new development of 
ethical theory, he did offer some new insights into 
34 
the responsibilities of the speaker, concepts that relate 
indirectly to ethos. Of all the rhetoricians surveyed so 
far, Channing is the first to consider social responsibili-
ty a part of the speaker's ethical duties. Channing 
believes that the speaker's ultimate duty was to help 
promote the "security of the individuals and of the state" 
through "laws and institutions" (13). Channing stressed 
again and again that in modern society, which differs 
drastically from the social structure of ancient Greek or 
Rome, the speaker cannot and should not use eloquence to 
advance his own wild dreams. He states that the speaker 
should help to "place the security of nations and of every 
individual on the broad foundation of laws and institu-
tions, and to make it the interest of the highest as 
well as the humblest citizen to respect and trust in them" 
( 15) • 
According to his editors, Dorothy I. Anderson and 
Waldo W. Braden, Channing's claim to fame was not his 
rhetorical theories nor his written work. Channing earned 
eternal fame through the students he taught, wrote Anderson 
and Braden, many of whom became famous literary figures in 
American literature (xi). Channing's editors believed that 
the students imbued with Channing's concepts of rhetoric's 
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ethical and social duties went out into the world to help 
shape American literature and the ethical attitude as we 
have it today (xii-xiii). It is this ethical attitude that 
we are concerned with in the next stage of our survey. 
Summary 
The Appendix gives a good summary of the results of 
this survey. Definitions of ethos and the techniques 
recommended fall along the range of the continuum, from the 
normative pole to the utilitarian pole. Some of the 
definitions fall right on the normative extreme, claiming 
that orators must be morally pure and sacred, while other 
definitions fall on the utilitarian half of the continuum, 
some hardly considering the orator's moral character to be 
relevant. 
There is more similarity between discussions of 
techniques than definitions of ethos. Graphically, all 
discussions of techniques fall on the utilitarian half of 
the continuum, and most of them are grouped in a cluster. 
Semantically, most of the techniques recommended encompass 
all possible means that will lead to the goal of persua-
sion. Graphically and semantically, Whately's discussion 
of techniques is the only irregularity, since he cautions 
against the display of rhetorical skills. 
The continuum so far has served its purpose; it 
contains all the personalized definitions and is still 
accurate enough to serve as a standard against which 
the new twentieth-century terminology will be judged in 
the next chapter. One thing we need to bear in mind 
before we begin another chapter. The definition of 
ethos and the discussion of the techniques to gain ethos 
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by each rhetorician are not usually located on the same 
half of the continuum. In other words, the two are located 
on opposite halves of the continuum, encompassing two 
contrasting points of view. No one rhetorician can be 
placed squarely on one or the other half of the continuum. 
This important point is displayed very nicely by the 
continuum. And this point is very important for the 
analysis of the new terminology offered in the next 
chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY VIEWS OF ETHOS 
Overview 
Since the late nineteenth century, many technological 
changes influenced the status of rhetoric as a discipline. 
The introduction of telephone, radio, and television 
drastically changed the means of everyday communica-
tion. The introduction of automobiles, interstate high-
ways, airplanes, spaceships, and satellites greatly 
shortened the spatial and temporal span of communication. 
These major changes in communication, coupled with the 
advances in science and technology, altered the environment 
in which rhetoric functions. 
To documl:!nt these drastic changes and to stimulate 
science and technology, twentieth-century society demanded 
a kind of discourse different from the subjective and often 
personal writing and oratory of the past. This discourse 
places clear, objective, and parsimonious description of 
facts above persuasion. As the need for a new kind of 
discourse grew, two new disciplines, technical writing and 
journalism, came into being. Accompanying the rise of 
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journalism and technical writing was the gradual dis-
appearance of rhetoric as a discipline. In comparing the 
fate of rhetoric in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
Richard Weaver commented that rhetoric has fallen from 
grace since the turn of the century (201). 
In some respects, ethos suffered the same fate that 
rhetoric did. The emphasis on objectivity and logic 
dimmed the value of ethos as the writer's or speaker's 
guide for projecting the appropriate image to the reader or 
audience. In fact, the role of ethos in technical writing 
and journalism was largely ignored by scholars until 
recently, because manuals and reports were considered to be 
too impersonal and factual to need any persuasive techni-
ques. 
In other respects, however, ethos fared better than 
rhetoric. Instead of disappearing from the literature on 
composition, it appeared in new forms under such terms as 
voice, implied author, stance, and juice. In its new 
forms, ethos became applicable to a wide variety of 
discourse forms, from creative writing to expository 
writing. Aside from its new form, ethos also lingered on 
in its original form in a few isolated instances, which 
will be discussed in detail later in the chapter. Because 
ethos, in its original form, did not completely disappear 
from the composition literature and because ethos blossomed 
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in its new forms, ethos continues to influence the compos!-
tion process and the criticism of the composition process 
in the twentieth century. 
In this chapter, I will examine in some detail the 
various new forms that ethos has acquired in this century 
and also examine ethos in its original form as it appears 
in this century. 
Wayne Booth: Ethos as implied author 
Wayne Booth championed a trend of analyzing literary 
work within a framework of ethos. Interestingly, Booth 
never used the term ethos in his literary criticism. 
Instead in The Rhetoric of Fiction, he uses the terms 
"implied author" and the author's "second self." Booth 
defines the two terms as the techniques creative writers 
use to obtain the desired ethical response from their 
readers (71). 
According to Booth, the implied author instructs the 
reader "where, in the world of values the author 
wants him to stand" (73). If created right, the implied 
author "is one that his most intelligent and perceptive 
readers can admire" (395); if created wrong, the implied 
author alienates the readers: 
Nothing will so certainly consign a 
work to ultimate oblivion as an implied 
author who detests his readers or who 
thinks that his work is better than it 
is. And nothing is so certain to lead 
an author into creating such a picture 
of himself as the effort to appear 
brighter, more esoteric, less commer-
cial than he really is. (Booth 395-6) 
In this statement, Booth implies that the ethos of the 
writer affects the ethos of the implied author, which in 
turn affects the reader's ethical response. Since the 
writer obtains the reader's response through manipula-
tion of the implied author, an entity separate from the 
writer according to Booth, the implied author is the 
projection of the writer's ethos, an idealized form of the 
writer's real personality. In other words, the implied 
author is the creative writers' technique of projecting 
the writers' ethos to the reader. 
Interpreting the implied author in this perspective, 
we may conclude that analysis of the implied author is 
actually analysis of ethos in creative writing. This 
claim may be substantiated by our considering the title of 
his book, The Rhetoric of Fiction. The title should 
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indicate clearly the orientation Booth chose for discussing 
creative writing, for he could just have easily chosen to 
use poetics rather than rhetoric in his title had his 
orientation of analysis not been from a rhetorical point of 
view. 
Besides indicating the relationship between the 
implied author and ethos, Booth also implies that, to 
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gain the reader's trust and favorable response, the 
implied author should not intentionally mislead the reader 
concerning the writer's personality and artistic ability. 
Ostentatious embellishments of either element will destroy 
the reader's trust in the implied author, and hence the 
writer. Booth's stress on the truthfulness of presentation 
indicates that his version of ethos leans more toward the 
normative pole of the continuum, where truth, sincerity, 
and moral goodness are emphasized. 
Peter Elbow: Ethos as juice 
Whereas Booth is concerned with the reader's response 
to the "implied author," the projection of the author by 
the text, Peter Elbow is interested in the reader's 
response to the concepts presented through the writing. 
Instead of emphasizing the reader's ethical response, Elbow 
is specifically concerned with the reader's acceptance of 
the authenticity of the concepts conveyed through the 
writing. Because ethos includes the appropriate presenta-
tion of both the orator's character and the material, 
Elbow's concern with the acceptance of the written contents 
falls under the domain of ethos. 
Elbow's technique for ensuring the reader's acceptance 
of the authenticity of the written content lies in the 
writer's investing intense emotional and intellectual 
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involvement in the subject matter so that the scene 
presented or the thought explained becomes vividly clear in 
the reader's mind. The amount of the writer's emotional 
and intellectual attachment to or involvement in the 
subject matter distinguishes a good writer from a bad 
writer. Intense involvement will enable the writer to 
see with his mind's eye the scene or understand the 
thought clearly in his mind before writing, endowing the 
writing with "juice," or voice, and allowing the reader no 
choice but to believe in the authenticity of the presented 
scene or the idea (Writing with Power 322-6). The credibi-
lity of the voice depends on the amount of emotion and 
intellect invested. A superficial investment may result in 
a superficial and unconvincing voice, while intense 
involvement with the subject matter results in a pro-
foundedly convincing voice, urging the reader to accept the 
scene or thought. 
In urging that the writer be intensely involved with 
the subject matter, Elbow states that the writer must "See 
it! Hear it! Feel its texture!" (340). Since the subject 
matter can be either a scene or an idea, the technique 
Elbow advocates can be employed in both creative and 
expository writing. 
Because Elbow is primarily concerned with presenting 
a believable scene or an idea (belief, thought, concept), 
his technique carries no ethical implications. Readers 
either accept or reject the authenticity of the scene or 
thought regardless of the ethics involved. Elbow's 
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concern with truthful representation and lack of concern 
with representation of truth indicates that Elbow's version 
of ethos, or juice as he calls it, leans heavily towards 
the utilitarian pole of the interpretation continuum. 
Ethos as Voice, stance, and Tone 
In twentieth-century composition studies, the term 
voice, often interchanged with stance and tone, can be used 
in different contexts and carry different meanings. It may 
refer to the writer's style, his attitude, persona, etc. 
Mostly, however, voice has been used as a twentieth-century 
substitute for ethos. A close look at some of the defini-
tions offered for voice will clarify the connection between 
voice and ethos. 
Theresa Enos defined voice as the "projection of one's 
participation in and attitude toward the subject and one's 
tone toward the intended reader" (5}. Virginia Draper 
defined voice as the "writer's attitude toward the reader 
... [and] the writer's attitude towards the subject or 
object about which s/he is writing" (4). Rise B. Axelrod 
and Charles R. Cooper defined voice as the "writer's 
attitude toward his or her subject and readers" (215). 
William H. Gilbert defined voice as "a helpful clue to 
[the] audience and [the writer's] purpose, as well as [to 
the writer's] attitude" (35). Dan Donlan defined voice 
as "the point of view and the emotional tone that the 
student must assume in conveying the message" (4). All 
these definitions share one common theme: they all refer 
to the writer's attitude toward either the audience or the 
subject matter. 
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The phrase "the attitude of a writer," a common 
definition of voice, shares similarity with, yet differs 
from, the phrase ''the character of the speaker," Aristo-
tle's detlnition of ethos. The attitude of a writer 
expressed through the writing indicates to the reader the 
personality and the point of view of the writer, the same 
way that the character of a writer does. However, the 
similarity ends once we pursue further the semantics of the 
two terms. The term "attitude" does not by itself carry 
any negative or positive connotation. It merely describes 
the writer's state of mind as conveyed through the writing. 
The term "character," on the other hand, indicates positive 
connotation and ethical implications. 
A closer look at the adjectives that usually accompany 
either ethos or voice will further clarify the subtle 
difference between the two terms. Aristotle used terms 
such as "intelligence," "goodwill," and "virtue" in his 
discussion of ethos (Cooper 92). Quintilian used terms 
such as "morality," while Cicero used terms such as 
"goodness." In the twentieth century, however, the 
adjectives that usually accompany voice are "personal," 
"formal," "witty," "businesslike," "serious," "playful," 
"authoritative," "trustworthy," and "reasonable." This 
second group of adjectives carries more stylistic than 
ethical implications. 
Occasionally, however, voice is defined as "the 
implied character" of the speaker as Wayne Booth did in 
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his famous article "The Rhetorical Stance'' (141). Booth's 
discussion of the three elements in communication indicates 
that his definition of voice is very similar to Aristotle's 
definition of ethos. Booth believes that three elements 
are at work in any communicative effort: "the available 
arguments about the subject itself, the interests and 
peculiarities of the audience, and the voice, the implied 
character, of the speaker" (141). His three elements as 
offered in his article appear to correspond closely with 
Aristotle's three means of persuasion: logos, pathos, and 
ethos. Booth's understanding of voice, defined as the 
implied character of the speaker, resembles his under-
standing of the implied author, both of which resemble 
closely the definition of ethos as offered by Aristotle and 
both of which belong to the normative half of the 
continuum. 
As famous as Booth's article is, the previous dis-
cussion on the various definitions of voice indicates that 
Booth's definition of voice with its emphasis on the 
normative half of the continuum appears not to be the only 
definition of voice. In fact, voice is often used to 
describe the stylistic aspects of the text, and stylistic 
implication, we should note, falls on the utilitarian half 
of the continuum. 
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The term voice has been used to describe all kinds of 
discourse: literary, referential, expressive, and persua-
sive. In discourses other than persuasive, the character 
of the writer as expressed through the discourse seems less 
important than the style of the discourse. Since the term 
voice carries more stylistic implications than ethical 
ones, the profuse use of voice in the twentieth century 
seems to imply a movement away from the normative pole of 
the continuum. 
Ethos as a Twentieth-Century Term 
Just as voice, a twentieth-century derivation of 
ethos, takes on many colorful stylistic characteristics, 
ethos in its own form has also ventured into more colorful 
and previously ignored situations. For instance, Robert 
Tremmel applied ethos to the teacher-student relationship 
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in the composition classroom (191). In this rhetorical 
situation, the teacher takes on the role of the speaker, 
while the students take on the role of the audience. Ethos 
in this situation implies that teachers should have "an 
open, inviting stance toward their students, their stu-
dents' language, and the whole teaching and writing 
process" (Robert Tremmel 191). Teachers should not 
dictate to the students. 
As a second example, a guest editorial in Teaching 
English in the Two Year College applied ethos to the 
correction of students' composition papers (176-8). To 
demonstrate a winning ethos in the rhetorical situation of 
commenting on students' papers, teachers are advised to 
follow the commonly acknowledged virtues of respect, 
discretion, fairness, promptness, and realistic world view 
in commenting on and grading the students' composition 
papers. Teachers are advised not to criticize the stu-
dents' papers for reasons other than the improvement of the 
students' writing skills. Teachers are also advised 
not to provide comments damaging to the students' learning 
process (176-8). 
As yet another example, Patricia L. Bizzell recently 
applied ethos to t·he media under the guise of media image 
(351). The rhetorical situation is the television talk 
show. Ethos in this situation refers to the media image 
the talk show host and his guests project, an image 
which consists mainly of the physical appearance and the 
mannerisms of the persons presented on television. Tradi-
tional ethical implications, Bizzell shows, such as 
virtues, are not part of the media version of ethos 
(351). 
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Also, ethos has recently become an important part of 
commerce. In the rhetorical situation of business attrac-
ting a clientele, ethos helps businesses and consumers 
choose between alternatives. For businesses, ethos means 
putting up the best front for the consumers, so businesses, 
states Richard Weaver, erect tall and imposing buildings to 
house their headquarters and branch offices (140). For 
consumers, the tall and imposing buildings of banks and 
business corporations convey a certain character of the 
organization (ethos) that smaller and less imposing 
buildings cannot project. Thus, the conL.ribution of ethos 
to commerce lies in supplying a common orientation for both 
businesses and consumers toward the image represented by 
buildings and other artifacts. 
James L. Kinneavy says that in advertising and 
politics, image and ethical argument reign supreme (240). 
Famous personalities from the sports, entertainment, or 
industrial worlds dominate the screen in advertising 
products, companies, or industries. Seldom is there a link 
between the product being advertised and the famous 
personality presenting the information. The famous 
personalities are used merely to elicit trust, respect, 
and goodwill, and ultimately to induce the audience to buy 
the product. This use of famous personalities for the 
sole purpose of eliciting favorable responses from the 
audience indicates that advertising depends heavily on 
ethos. This use of ethos comes not from the Aristotelian 
tradition; rather it comes from the Ciceronian tradition, 
in which the creation of ethos comes both from the spea-
ker's reputation and from the speech itself. 
The same emphasis on ethos occurs in politics. 
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Politicians usually represent themselves as moral, hard-
working, competent, and well-informed. They attempt to 
present as ethical an image to the public as they possibly 
can. In referring to their political rivals, however, 
politicians usually paint them as immoral, lazy, incompe-
tent, and ignorant. Fighting for the most ethical position 
in the public's mind, politicians assume, rightly or 
wrongly, that success in politics depends on ethos. 
This assumption leads to ethos as the ethical image of the 
candidate being used often as the main theme in political 
campaigns. 
Colorful and original as these applications are, the 
definition of ethos in the twentieth century has not 
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differed from that of the ancients. In fact, in defining 
ethos, rhetoricians in the twentieth century either refer 
to the ancients' definition or agree with the ancients' 
definition. For instance, one rhetorician agrees with 
Quintilian's comment that "the true orator is the good man, 
skilled in speaking--good in his formed character and 
right in his ethical philosophy" (Richard Weaver 224). 
Textbooks which discuss ethos in detail tend to follow 
the ancients' definition and application, as does Edward P. 
J. Corbett's Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student and 
Robert M. Brown's Writing for a Reader. Occasionally, 
ethos may be defined in a textbook as "authority-based 
reasoning," but the term is quickly modified with terms 
such as "ethical-based reasoning" (Fred. D. White 125). 
Even when ethos is finally applied to technical writing, 
as has been done in recent years, the definition of ethos 
still remains the same. The ethos of technical writing is 
defined as the character of the writer or, in the case of 
the manuals, the character of the corporation (Eve Walsh 
Stoddard 234-5). 
Summary 
In the twentieth century, drastic environmental 
changes appear to have shifted emphasis away from persua-
sive discourse. Other forms of discourse, such as ex-
pressive, referential, and literary, seem to gain more 
academic attention and recognition. Under such drastic 
environmental changes, rhetoric gradually disappeared as a 
discipline until its recent rebirth. 
Ethos, on the other hand, fared better than rhetoric 
in this century. Instead of gradually disappearing from 
composition studies and practices, ethos retained its 
original form and took on new forms to accommodate the 
changes in the environment. It took on the form of 
"implied author" in literary criticism, and it took on the 
form of "voice" or "juice" in expressive and literary 
works. When ethos appears in its original form, the 
definition and application tend to swing toward the 
normative pole of the interpretative continuum. However, 
when ethos appears in its new forms, the definition and 
application tend to swing toward the utilitarian pole of 




The environmental changes since the ancient Greek and 
Roman times have been many and complex. To accommodate 
these changes, discourse has undergone several correspon-
ding changes: rhetoric has gone from glorious and politi-
cally powerful oratory, to written discourse--and to 
eventual decline as a discipline in the twentieth century. 
The most recent change comes in the form of replacing 
traditional rhetorical terminology with the increasingly 
more popular new terminology. 
This thesis investigated whether the meaning of the 
new terminology differs substantially from that of the 
traditional terminology. Ethos was picked to be the target 
of investigation. A short historical survey of various 
individual definitions of ethos was conducted, followed by 
a survey of the various forms that ethos has assumed in the 
twentieth century. 
The survey conducted in Chapter II and III established 
the fact that no historical consensus about the definition 
of ethos exists. Rhetoricians prior to the twentieth 
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century tend to develop their own personalized definitions 
of ethos and advise techniques for creating ethos. 
Frequently, the definition of ethos and the techniques 
recommended for creating ethos by each rhetorician differ 
in intent. The definitions of ethos were intended to be 
used as normative models, as ideal standards for behavior, 
recommending what should be done. The techniques offered 
for creating ethos were intended, on the other hand, to be 
used as positive models, recommending what can be done. 
The working definition of ethos proposed in Chapter 
I--the interpretative continuum anchored by normative 
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and utilitarian poles--encompasses all the definitions and 
techniques cited in Chapter II and III, thus confirming its 
efficiency. The next question is whether the same continu-
um can be just as efficient in encompassing the meaning of 
ethos in the twentieth century, thereby confirming that the 
new terminology does not differ in meaning from the 
traditional terminology. 
As Chapter IV shows, the meaning of the various forms 
of ethos in the twentieth century all fall within the range 
of the continuum. The normative model of ethos appears to 
have changed little: no new definitions uf ethos has been 
offered in the twentieth century. The positive model of 
ethos, on the other hand, appears to have changed a great 
deal. Ethos is used in situations which were not familiar 
to our predecessors: television, commercial advertising, 
architecture, creative writing, classroom teaching, 
grading, etc. However, these changes in techniques are 
more superficial than substantive: they come more from 
difference in applications than from inherent differences. 
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Drastic environmental changes necessitated the new 
applications of ethos. With the introduction of different 
communication technology, many new situations became 
available to discourse; oral and visual communication 
became possible as well as written discourse. Rhetoric 
adjusted to these changes by applying ethos to the new 
communication situations, using terms such as media image. 
However, the basic, underlying rhetorical situation did not 
change; only the terminology used to describe the communi-
cation situation changed. Interpreting from this perspec-
tive, we see that the new applications of ethos in the 
twentieth century represent nothing more than rhetoric once 
more adjusting to its changing environment. 
Aside from offering different applications of ethos, 
the twentieth-century interpretation of ethos also laid a 
heavier emphasis on the utilitarian half of the continuum 
as shuwn by the greater popularity of the term voice. A 
look at the appendix reveals that in previous centuries 
rhetoricians were concerned both with the normative and the 
utilitarian poles of the definition of ethos. In this 
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century, however, the emphasis is mainly on the utilitarian 
pole of the continuum as shown by the popularity of voice 
and the various new applications of ethos. However, this 
trend is a continuation of that started by Whately, whose 
definition of ethos and whose techniques for creating 
ethos both fall within the utilitarian half of the conti-
nuum. 
Well aware of the utility of ethos, Whately recom-
mended the hiding of rhetorical skills and the speaker's 
reputation from the audience to gain maximum persuasiveness 
in each situation. His recommendation represents a very 
sophisticated orientation toward the audience and the 
control of its reaction. The twentieth-century emphasis on 
voice, which carries more stylistic than normative implica-
tions, is a continuation of that sophistication manifested 
by Whately. Analysis of discourse in terms of voice rather 
than ethos carries less normative implications, thus 
throwing more light on what can be done. The increased 
attention to what can be done improves the subtlety and the 
sophistication of audience control, thus continuing the 
trend started by Whately. 
As the above discussion indicates, there are no 
substantive changes in either the normative nor the 
positive models in the twentieth century: the continuum 
continues to encompass contemporary definitions of ethos. 
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The continuum's efficiency proves two points. First, the 
new terminology does not differ in meaning from the 
traditional terminology. Second, the continuum can be a 
good, encompassing definition .of ethos. According to this 
definition, ethos can be both normative and positive. It 
can be an ideal standard by which rhetoricians should model 
their conduct, and it can be specific techniques by which 
rhetoricians can gain their persuasive goal in a particular 
discourse. It can range from extreme to moderate for 
either model, and individuals can choose their stand within 
the continuum according to their beliefs and values. And 
it can encompass all definitions of ethos, ancient or 
modern. 
To conclude, the investigation of ethos shows that 
the twentieth-century terminology does not differ signifi-
cantly in meaning from that of traditional terminology. 
However, the investigation of one term cannot represent the 
fate of the vast rhetorical terminology. But it does raise 
an interesting point: does other rhetorical terminology 
share the fate of ethos, changing names but not meaning? 
Much more research is needed to answer this question in any 
satisfactory way. I hope that this thesis will stimulate 
this additional research. 
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normative pole --------- <---- Quintilian's definition of ethos 




<-- Edward Channing's definition oi ethos 
<-- Saint Augustine (normative) 
<-- Ca~pbell's and Blair's definition of ethos 
<-- Cicero's definition of ethos 
<-- Saint Augustine (positive) 
<-- Aristotle's definition of ethos 
<-- Whately's definition of ethos 
\-- Quintilian's discussion of techniques 
<-- Cicero's discussion of techniques 
<-- Ca•pbell's and Blair's discussion of techniques 
<-- Whately's discussion of techniques 
utilitarian pole ---------
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